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A REASONABLE RENDITION OF
REGISTRATION: GOPETS V. HISE,
SCHMIDHEINY V. WEBER, AND
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, Congress determined that existing trademark law was
an ineffective means of combating cybersquatting.' In response to
this problem, Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act ("ACPA").2 The ACPA was meant to provide
trademark holders and individuals an explicit remedy against
cybersquatters.' However, for a trademark owner to bring a cause
of action against a cybersquatter, the cybersquatter had to register
the domain name with a domain name registrar after the mark
became famous or distinctive.' In contrast, for an individual to
bring a cause of action based on a cybersquatter's use of that
individual's personal name, the cybersquatter had to register the
1. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7 (1999) ("Instances of cybersquatting continue to
grow each year because there is no clear deterrent and little incentive for
cybersquatters to discontinue their abusive practices. . . . Legislation is needed
to address these problems and to protect consumers . . . "); H. REP. No. 106-412,
at 5 (1999) ("The legal recourse provided for in this legislation, combined with
the intellectual property alternative dispute resolution procedures being adopted
by the domain name registrars, will give trademark owners important tools to
protect their intellectual property.").
2. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501A-445-552(1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006) and 15
U.S.C. § 8131 (2006)).
3. 145 CONG. REc. S14696, 14713 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999) ("This
subsection amends the Trademark Act to provide an explicit trademark remedy
for cybersquatting under a new section 43(d)."); Id. at 14715. "[This] subsection
... prohibits the registration of a domain name that is the name of another living
person . . . without such person's permission, if the registrants specific intent is
to profit form the domain name by selling it back for financial gain to such
person or a third party.").
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(a)(1)(ii)(I)-(I1).
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domain name with a registrar after the effective date of the
ACPA.
While the timing of registration plays a crucial role in whether
the Act applies, the statute does not contain an explicit definition
of "registration." This is problematic because a domain name
owner can do variety of things with a domain that might
potentially qualify as an act of registration under the ACPA.
These actions include renewing a domain name's registration
contract, updating a domain name's billing information, and
transferring a domain name from one owner to another.' Since any
of these activities could potentially be considered registrations,'
knowing whether or not these activities bring the actions of a
domain name holder under the scope of the Act is particularly
important. Recently, a Circuit split has developed as to the
meaning of registration and two competing definitions have been
proposed.! This note aims to analyze which of these definitions, if
either, is correct in light of the legislative intent behind the Act.
Part II of the article will provide background information on the
Domain Name System ("DNS"), cybersquatters, the ACPA, and
Schmidheiny v. Weber, a Third Circuit case which first dealt with
the definition of registration. Part III will discuss the subject
opinion of this note, GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, which provided an
alternate definition of registration. Part IV will discuss whether
the Ninth Circuit defined registration correctly in light of the
statutory language and legislative history. Additionally, this Part
contains a proposal to define registration as any act that results in a
new registration contract. Part V will discuss the future
implications of the ruling, as well as what future actions are
necessary to effectively combat cybersquatting.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 8131(4).
6. GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, 657 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2011).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1031.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Domain Name System and Cybersquatters
Every website found on the Internet has an Internet protocol
("IP") address consisting of a string of numbers.' These numbers
represent a website's location on the Internet and if the numbers
are entered into the search bar of a web browser, they will lead to
the corresponding website.' Because this string of numbers is
very difficult to remember, IP addresses are not extremely useful
to people trying to find a particular website." The DNS helps
solve this problem by linking a domain name to an IP address,
allowing individuals to type an easier to remember, alphanumeric
string into the address bar of a browser, and come to the same
website. This alphanumeric string is called a domain name. 2
The DNS is comprised of three primary actors: registries,
registrars and registrants."
First, companies called "registries" operate a
database (or "registry") for all domain names within
the scope of their authority. Second, companies
called "registrars" register domain names with
registries on behalf of those who own the names.
Registrars maintain an ownership record for each
domain name they have registered with a registry. .
. . Third, individuals and companies called
"registrants" own the domain names. Registrants
interact with the registrars, who in turn interact with
the registries. 4
9. 1 PAUL D. MCGRADY, McGRADY ON DOMAIN NAMES § 1.03 (Mathew
Bender, 2011).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. § 1.02.
13. Office Depot, Inc. v. Zuccarini, 596 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2010).
14. Id.
451
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Registrants enter into contracts with registrars for a specific
term," and "[r]egistrants renew their domain name through the
registrars from whom they purchased their domain names."
Generally, domain names are registered under a first-come, first
served basis." If a domain name is not renewed by the registrant,
then after a grace period, the registrar notifies the registry that the
registration is to be deleted and other registrants may obtain the
domain name."
Though registrants are often regarded as the "owners" of a
domain name, the question of whether a domain name constitutes
property is not entirely settled.19 Some courts have been reluctant
to hold that domain names are personal property because they are
the product of a service contract between the registrar and
registrant.20 According to these courts, the registrant does not have
rights to the domain name outside of the contract terms, and
therefore the registrant does not own the domain name in the
traditional sense.2 1
However, the dominant view is that there is some kind of a
property right in a domain name.2 2 In many ways, this view is
consistent with how domains are used in the real world. Domain
names are routinely traded 23 and there is a robust aftermarket for
domain names.24  The first come, first served nature of domain
registration also lends itself to analogies in the real property
context. 25 This includes land speculation analogies, where people
own specific areas of the Internet by virtue of the fact that they had
15. McGRADY, supra note 9, at § 1.09.
16. Id. § 1.11.
17. Smith v. Network Solutions, Inc,, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1162 (N.D. Ala.
2001).
18. McGRADY, supra note 9, at § 1.09.
19. Id. § 1.06.
20. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86, 770 (Va.
2000); Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999).
21. Network Solutions, 529 S.E.2d at 86.
22. MCGRADY, supra note 9, § 1.06[d].
23. Jacqueline D. Lipton, Bad Faith in Cyberspace: Grounding Domain
Name Theory in Trademark, Property, and Restitution, 23 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
447,453 (2010).
24. MCGRADY, supra note 9, § 1.05.
25. Lipton, supra note 23, at 453.
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the foresight to register the domain name first.26 Though these real
property analogies are intuitively appealing, they run into
difficulty when the first come, first served nature of the DNS
collides with the rights of individuals and trademark holders.27
The existence of these intangible property rights limits the
usefulness of the personal property model, because trademark
holders have some rights in a domain name by virtue of their
trademark in certain terms.2 8
Regardless of whether domain names are property rights, it is
undisputable that once a registrant has registered a domain there
are a wide variety of things the registrant can do with her domain
name. The registrant can develop or build up a personal website,
build a business, sell the domain to another party, use the domain
as a means to advertise, or do nothing with it.29
Due to the economic nature of many of these activities, domain
names often acquire a significant monetary value.30 This monetary
value is enhanced by the uniqueness requirement of domain
names.3 ' As such, companies often desire to have high degree of
similarity between their trademarks and their domain names.32
Similarly, famous individuals often desire to have control over
domain names that consist of their personal name."
However, trademark owners and celebrities did not always
realize the value of domain names.34 In the early days of the
26. Id. at 453-54.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 454.
29. What Can You Do With Your New Domain Name From GoDaddy.com?,
Go DADDY (June 22, 2011), http://www.godaddyguides.com/2011/06/22/what-
can-you-do-with-your-new-domain-name-from-godaddy-com.
30. See Chris Irvine, Top 10 Most Expensive Domain Names, THE
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 10, 2010, 11:08 AM), www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/news/7412544/Top-i 0-most-expensive-domain-names.html.
31. Susan Thomas Johnson, Internet Domain Name and Trademark
Disputes: Shifting Paradigms in Intellectual Property, 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 465,
469 (2001) ("The uniqueness requirement of domain names creates an
exclusivity that has important economic ramifications, since only one entity can
use a specific domain name.").
32. Id.
33. Lipton, supra note 23, at 463.
34. Id. at 447-48.
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Internet, many tech savvy individuals beat the trademark owners to
the punch, registered domain names in their own name, and then
attempted to sell the domain names back to the trademark holders
at a handsome profit." This practice became so pervasive that
these individuals were eventually bequeathed a name:
cybersquatters.
In response to this practice, aggrieved parties often would bring
legal actions against cybersquatters under the Lanham Act for
trademark infringement or unfair competition.3 6 However, these
actions have drawbacks. For a trademark owner to succeed in an
infringement action against a cybersquatter, they must show (1)
rights in the trademark and (2) that the unauthorized use of the
trademark by another will result in a likelihood of confusion."
This presents a problem because in order to establish a likelihood
of confusion, the trademark owner generally has to show a
similarity between the goods and services they offer and the goods
and services offered by the cybersquatter." This provides
cybersquatters with a means to avoid liability for infringement. So
long as cybersquatters do not use the domain to offer similar goods
or services as the trademark holder, they can avoid liability.39
Actions brought under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
("FTDA") have also proved an ill fit for cybersquatting. For a
trademark owner to prevail against a cybersquatter under the
FTDA, (1) the owner must show that the mark is famous, (2) that
the cybersquatter's use is commercial, and (3) that the use is likely
to cause dilution.40 In the early days of cybersquatting, it was
problematic for trademark owners to prove a cybersquatter's use
was commercial, considering early courts dealing with the issue
held mere registration of the domain name was not a commercial
35. Id. at 448.
36. D. Troy Blair, My Trademark Is Not Your Domain: Development and
Recent Interpretation of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 39
DUQ. L. REV. 415, 417 (2001).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
38. M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm't, 421 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir.
2005).
39. Blair, supra note 36, at 424-25.
40. Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1238 (N.D. 111. 1996).
454
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purpose by itself. 4 ' This meant a cybersquatter could register a
name, not make an offer to sell the domain name back to the
trademark owner, and wait for the trademark owner to attempt to
purchase the domain, all while avoiding liability under the
FTDA.42
B. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
In 1999, it became clear to Congress that using existing
trademark law to prevent cybersquatting was not working,43 and in
response Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act ("ACPA")." The ACPA provides two different
types of plaintiffs with a cause of action against cybersquatters.
First, the section of the ACPA codified in 15 U.S.C § 1125 gives
trademark holders a cause of action against registrants who possess
bad faith intent to profit off the goodwill associated with the
trademark (hereinafter "trademark section").4 5 The trademark
section does this in two ways that are loosely analogous to the
41. See Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal.
1996) ("Registration of a trade as a domain name, without more, is not a
commercial use of the trademark and therefore is not within the prohibitions of
the Act")
42. Blair, supra note 36, at 421.
43. See supra note I and accompanying text.
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d), 8131 (2006).
45. Id. § 1125(d). Section 1125(d)(1)(A) of the Code provides:
(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a
mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark
under this section, if, without regard to the goods or services
of the parties, that person-
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section;
and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that-
(1) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly
similar to that mark;
(11) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly
similar to or dilutive of that mark; . ..
Id.
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causes of action for trademark infringement or trademark dilution.
In the case of a distinctive trademark, the registrant must register,
traffic in, or use a domain name that is identical or confusingly
similar to a mark that is distinctive at the time of the registration of
the domain name.46 In the case of famous marks, on the other
hand, the registrant must register, traffic in, or use a mark that is
identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a mark that is
famous at the time of registration.7
In either situation, the trademark holder must show that the
registrant acted with "bad faith."48 To aid courts in the
determination of whether bad faith exists, the statute sets forth nine
nonexclusive factors.49 These factors can be broken down into
three categories: (1) factors that that "suggest circumstances that
may tend to indicate an absence of bad-faith intent to profit from
the goodwill of a mark,"" (2) factors that "suggest circumstances
that may tend to indicate that such bad-faith intent exists"" and (3)
46. Id. § 1125(d) (1)(A)(ii)(1).
47. Id. § 1125(d) (1)(A)(ii)(II).
48. Id. § 1125(d) (1)(A)(i).
49. Id. § 1125(d) (1)(B).
50. 145 CONG. REC. S14696, 14713. These factors include:
(1) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the
person, if any, in the domain name;
(11) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal
name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly
used to identify that person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or
services; [and]
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the
mark in a site accessible under the domain name; . . .
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B).
51. 145 CONG. REC. S14696, 14713. These factors include:
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain
name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark,
either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or
disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to
the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for
456
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a factor that "may suggest either bad-faith or an absence thereof
depending on the circumstances.""
If the trademark holder can show that the registrant has violated
the ACPA, they are entitled to statutory damages" and a court
ordered transfer of the domain name.54 Also, if the trademark
holder is unable to locate the registrant, the trademark holder can
bring an in rem proceeding against the domain name, and obtain a
court ordered transfer."
According to Congress, the trademark section of the ACPA,
is carefully and narrowly tailored to extend to cases
where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
defendant registered, trafficked in, or used the
offending domain name with bad-faith intent to
profit from the good will of a mark belonging to
someone else. Thus, the bill does not extend to
innocent domain name registrations by those who
financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use,
the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or
services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of
such conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false
contact information when applying for the registration of the
domain name, the person's intentional failure to maintain
accurate contact information, or the person's prior conduct
indicating a pattern of such conduct; [and]
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple
domain names which the person knows are identical or
confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at
the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of
famous marks of others that are famous at the time of
registration of such domain names, without regard to the
goods or services of the parties; ...
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B).
52. 145 CONG. REc. S14696, 14713. This factor is: "(LX) the extent to which
the mark incorporated in the person's domain name registration is or is not
distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c)." 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(1)(B).
53. Id. § 1117(d) (2006).
54. Id. § 1125(d) (1)(C).
55. Id.§ 1125(d) (2).
457
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are unaware of another's use of the name, or even
to someone who is aware of the trademark status of
the name but registers a domain name containing
the mark for any reason other than bad faith intent
to profit from the good will associated with mark. 6
In addition to providing trademark holders with a cause of action
against cybersquatters, the section of the ACPA codified in 15
U.S.C. § 8131 provides a cause action for individuals whose
personal name had been registered by a cybersquatter (hereinafter
"personal name section")." Under the personal name section, an
individual can recover so long as the cybersquatter's registration
was made without the individual's consent, and with the specific
intent to profit from selling the domain for a financial gain.5 8
Unlike the trademark cause of action, which applies to every
domain name registration made before or after the enactment of
the ACPA, the personal name section only applies to domain
names that have been registered on or after the date of the
enactment of the ACPA."
In addition to these causes of action, the ACPA added the
definitions of the "Internet," and "domain name" to the Trademark
Act.o However, the ACPA did not elaborate on the meaning of
56. 145 CONG. REC. Sl4696, 14713.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 8131.
58. Id. Section 8131(1)(A) of the Code provides:
(A) Civil liability. Any person who registers a domain name
that consists of the name of another living person, or a name
substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that
person's consent, with the specific intent to profit from such
name by selling the domain name for financial gain to that
person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by
such person...
Id.
59. Id. § 8131(4).
60. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protect Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501A-445, 1501A-550 ("The term 'domain name' means any
alphanumeric designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain
name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name registration
authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet. The term 'Internet' has
10
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"registration" under the Act. This lack of a definition is
problematic. While it is clear that the initial registration of a
domain name constitutes a registration under the ACPA, it is
unclear if other activities performed by the registrant after the
initial registration might constitute a registration as well.'
For instance, after the initial registration, "the registrant can
update the registration if her contact or billing information
changes."6 2 The registrant can also "switch between registrars, but
leave her contact and billing information unchanged,"63 or "change
the name of the registrant without changing who pays for the
domain."' These actions may or may not be create liability under
the ACPA, depending on how registration is defined under the
Act.
C. Schmidheiny v. Weber
In Schmidheiny v. Weber, the Third Circuit had to determine
whether one of the above mentioned actions constituted a
registration under the ACPA.65 The plaintiff, Stephan
Schmidheiny, was one of the world's wealthiest individuals.6 6 The
defendant, Steven Weber, personally registered
<schmidheiny.com> on February 28, 1999, prior to the date on
which the ACPA became effective, November 29, 1999.67 In June
of 2000, Weber transferred the registration of his domain name to
his company, Famology.com, Inc.68 In doing so, Famology.com
contractually bound itself into a new registration agreement with a
different registrar than the registrar Weber had initially used when
the domain was in his personal name." Weber then sent an email
the meaning given that term in section 230(f)(1) of the Communications Act of
1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(f )(1)).").
61. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1030-3 1.
62. Id. at 1030.
63. Id. at 1031.
64. Id.
65. 319 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 2003).
66. Id. at 581.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 583.
459
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to Schmidheiny's assistant and offered to sell the domain name to
Schmidheiny." In response, Schmidheiny commenced an action
under the ACPA alleging that Weber and his company violated the
personal name section of the ACPA.
The district court ruled that the "re-registration" of
<schmidheiny.com> was not covered by the ACPA because the
name was first registered several months before the date when the
statute became effective, and "the statute references only
registrations, not re-registrations."72 According to the district court,
"Congress made a clear legislative choice that [the ACPA] is not
to be applied retroactively," and the plain meaning of registration
as used by Congress includes only the initial registration of the
domain name."
The Third Circuit disagreed.74 The Third Circuit explained that
"initial" and "creation" appeared nowhere in the personal name
section of the ACPA, and that Congress provided no exception for
"non-creation registrations."" Accordingly, the Third Circuit
concluded that the language of the statute did not limit the word
registration to "creation registration."7 6
The court also reasoned that if the statute was limited only to
creation registration, "the domain names of living persons [could]
be sold and purchased without the living persons' consent, ad
infinitum, so long as the name was first registered before the
effective date of the Act." The court found this result would be
contrary to the Congressional intent behind the Act." To avoid
this result, the court held that the word registration included a new
contract between a different registrar and a different registrant, and
remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.79
70. Id. at 581.
71. Schmidheiny, 319 F.3d at 582.
72. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 583.
77. Schmidheiny, 319 F.3d at 583.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 582.
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After Schmidheiny, at least one other court reached a similar
result regarding the definition of registration."o However, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals would soon issue an opinion that
arrived at a different definition of registration using a different line
of reasoning.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT FORMS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND
GOPETS, LTD. v HISE
A. Factual Background
In March of 1999, Edward Hise registered <gopets.com> in his
own name with Network Solutions, LLC." He also developed a
business plan for the domain name as part of a marketing class he
was enrolled in.82 Edward Hise and his brother Joseph also owned
a corporation called Digital Overture, which performed internet-
related services for clients." At the time of litigation, the Hise
brothers and Digital Overture ("Hise") had registered more than
1300 domain names, most of which were plausible names for
businesses that did not yet exist.8 4
In 2004, Eric Bethke founded the company GoPets, Ltd.
("GoPets") in Korea." This company "created a game featuring
virtual pets that moved from the computers of registered users.""
GoPets filed an application to register the GOPETS mark in the
United States in September of 2004, and the mark was registered
in November of 2006.
80. See Ricks v. BMEzine.com, LLC, 727 F. Supp. 2d 936, 954 (D. Nev.
2010) ("If a domain name was registered in good faith originally, but thereafter
re-registered in bad faith, the cybersquatter would escape liability, a result not
supportable by the statutory scheme.").
81. Amended Order on Plaintiffs Partial Summary Judgment Motion at 4,
GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, No. CV 07-1870 AHM (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2008).
82. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1026-27.
83. Id. at 1027.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
461
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In 2004, Bethke attempted to buy the <gopets.com> domain
name from Hise." Hise responded to Bethke and explained that he
had originally planned to build a business at <gopets.com>, but
that he was open to selling the domain name to a "serious buyer.""
Hise then informed Bethke that he would be holding an auction on
September 15, and that Bethke should submit a bid." In October
of that year, Bethke contacted Hise again and noted that since the
date of the auction had passed, and since Hise was still the owner
of the domain name, there were no other serious buyers." Bethke
then offered $750.00 for the domain name, but Hise refused to sell
at that price.92 In response, in May of 2006, Bethke initiated an
action against Hise by filing a complaint under the Uniform
Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy ("UDRP") 9 with the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO").94
Hise prevailed in the UDRP proceeding.9 5 Though the WIPO
arbitrator doubted that Hise ever intended to develop a website at
<gopets.com>, the arbitrator found Hise had not registered the
domain in bad faith since his initial registration occurred five years
before GoPets was founded.9 6 Since UDRP regulations only
compel the transfer of domain names if they are registered in bad
faith, Hise remained in possession of the name. After the WIPO
88. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1027.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The UDRP is an alternative dispute resolution process created by the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"). Id. When
an individual becomes the registrant for a domain name, the registrant agrees to
submit to mandatory administrative proceedings before an arbitrator in the event
that a third party asserts a complaint against a registrant alleging bad faith. See
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN (October 24, 1999),
http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm. UDRP proceedings
have a lower cost and are often resolved quicker than ACPA proceedings.
McGRADY, supra note 9, § 2.02. By bringing a UDRP action, individuals do
not surrender their rights to bring a cause of action under the ACPA. Id.
94. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1027.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1027-28.
97. Id. at 1028.
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ruling, starting in November of 2006, Hise registered eighteen
other domain names that were similar to <gopets.com>. 98
Bethke again attempted to buy the <gopets.com> domain name
from Hise, but this time offered $40,000.99 However, Bethke
notified Hise that he owned another domain, <gopetslive.com>,
and that he was prepared to go forward using this name on
December 11, 2006.'o In response, Hise sent Bethke an email
with a letter attached stating that if Bethke developed
<gopetslive.com> instead of purchasing <gopets.com>, potential
users would be confused, and search engines would be less
effective in finding <gopetslive.com>.'O' The letter also stated that
if <gopets.com> were developed further, <gopetslive.com> might
face competitive metatagging. 02 The letter ended with an offer to
sell the <gopets.com> to GoPets Ltd. for $5 million dollars.'03
Two days after sending this email, Edward Hise changed the name
of the registrant for <gopets.com> from himself to Digital
Overtures." However, Network Solutions, Inc. continued to be
the registrar for the website.o5
In January of 2007, GoPets rejected Hise's $5 million dollar
offer,'06 and in March of 2007, Hise incorporated the GOPETS
mark into the metatags for <gopets.com>, and changed the content
of the <gopets.com> website to read that the site was the "official"
<gopets.com> website using a font that was similar in appearance
to the font used by GoPets, Ltd. at <gopetslive.com>.o 7
98. Id. at 1028-29.
99. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1028.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. ("Metatagging is inserting words into the code of a web page that
help determine how it appears in search results").
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Claims for
Federal and State Service Mark Infringement and Unfair Competition, and
Cybersquatting in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(b), Declaration of Clifford S.
Davidson, Ex. C., at 76-85, GoPets, Ltd. v. Hise, No. CV 07-1870 AHM(C.D.
Cal. June 10, 2008).
106. Amended Order, supra note 81, at 7-8.
107. Id. at 8.
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B. District Court Decision
On March 21, 2007, GoPets filed a complaint against Hise in the
Central District of California, alleging cybersquatting under the
ACPA, service mark infringement, and unfair competition under
the Lanham Act and California law, as well as false advertising
under California law.'"I GoPets sought injunctive relief, transfer of
the domain names, statutory damages, accounting for wrongful
profits, actual damages, and attorney's fees.'09
The court began with the Lanham Act claims. Based on Hise's
use of the GOPETS mark on the website, the content that was
posted March of 2007, and the use of metatags, the district court
determined that Hise had violated the Lanham Act, and granted
GoPets motion for summary judgment with respect to the Lanham
Act claims.'
The district court then looked at GoPets' ACPA claims. The
district court determined there was no dispute that the GOPETS
mark was distinctive when Hise registered the eighteen other
domain names using "gopets" variations starting in November of
2006.'" However, the initial registration of <gopets.com>
occurred prior to registration of the distinctive GOPETS mark;
therefore, the court had to determine whether Edward Hise's
transfer of the name of the registrant for <gopets.com> from
himself to Digital Overtures constituted a registration."2 The
district court determined that the transfer of names constituted a
"re-registration," and relied on Schmidheiny to hold that that a re-
registration was the same as a registration under the ACPA."'
Based on this, Hise's actions with regard to <gopets.com> fell
within the scope of the ACPA. The district court then analyzed all
nineteen registrations, determined that Hise had "registered" the
domain names in bad faith based on ACPA's nine bad faith
108. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1029.
109. Id.
110. Amended Order, supra note 81, at 11-12.
111. Id. at 14.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 14-15.
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factors, and granted GoPets motion for summary judgment with
respect to the ACPA claims. 114
As relief, the district court ordered that Hise transfer all nineteen
domain names to GoPets."' The district court awarded statutory
damages under the ACPA, granting GoPets $100,000 for the
unlawful use of <gopets.com> and $1,000 for each of the
remaining eighteen domain names.'16
C. Ninth Circuit Opinion
The Ninth Circuit looked to the text of the ACPA and the
established test for determining whether GoPets could prevail on
its ACPA claim."' In order to prevail, GoPets had to show: "(1)
registration of a domain name, (2) that was 'identical or
confusingly similar to' a mark that was distinctive at the time of
registration, and (3) 'bad faith intent' at the time of registration.""'
Because the litigation included <gopets.com>, which was
originally registered by Hise prior to GoPets's trademark
registration, the essential issue was whether Hise's "re-
registration" of the domain name to Digital Overtures counted as
"registration" under the ACPA."' On appeal, GoPets conceded
that the <gopets.com> domain name was not "identical or
confusingly similar to" a protected mark when Hise registered the
mark in 1999.120 However, GoPets argued the district court
correctly relied on Schmidheiny to interpret that registration under
the ACPA included the 2006 Digital Overture "re-registration."21
The Ninth Circuit noted the lack of a "registration" definition in
the ACPA.122  The court explained that while the initial
registrations are clearly registrations under that Act, it is unclear as
to whether subsequent acts of a registrant constituted
114. Id. at 15-19.
115. Id. at 20.
116. Amended Order, supra note 81, at 22-23.
117. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1029.
118. Id. at 1029-30.
119. Id. at 1030.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
465
17
Price: A Reasonable Rendition of Registration: GoPets v. Hise, Schmidhei
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXII:449
registration.'23 These acts include changing registrars, updating
billing information, or changing the name of the registrant or entity
that pays for the maintenance of the domain name.'24
The court then analyzed the Schmidheiny decision.'25 The Ninth
Circuit noted that Schmidheiny dealt with a registration under the
personal name section of the ACPA, but like the trademark
section, the personal name section refers to registration without
defining the term.'26 According to the Ninth Circuit, the Third
Circuit erroneously assumed that the personal name section did not
cover the domain name in Schmidheiny because it was registered
prior to the passage of the ACPA.'2 7 This assumption had led the
Third Circuit to determine that re-registration was a registration
under the Act, because holding otherwise would "permit the
domain names of living persons to be sold and purchased without
the living person's consent, ad infinitum, so long as the name was
first registered before the effective date of the Act."'28 According
to the Ninth Circuit, if the Schmidheiny defendant's registration
initially violated the personal name section, then the Third
Circuit's "concern would evaporate."' 29
The Ninth Circuit then looked at the ACPA in light of traditional
property law.' The court noted that it was undisputed that Hise
could have retained all of the rights to <gopets.com> indefinitely
had he maintained the registration under the name of Edward
Hise."' The court saw "no basis in ACPA to conclude that a right
that belongs to an initial registrant of a currently registered domain
123. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1030.
124. Id. at 1030-31
125. Id. at 1031.
126. Id.
127. Id. Unless the Ninth Circuit would hold that the plaintiff in
Schmidheiny had a trademark right to his personal name, it appears that the
Ninth Circuit did not see that the personal name statute does not apply to
domain name registrations done prior to the effective date of the Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 8131(4).
128. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1031 (quoting Schmidheiny, 319 F.3d at 583).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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name is lost when that name is transferred to another owner."l32
Because "[t]he general rule is that a property owner may sell all of
the rights he holds in property," holding that a re-registration was
a registration under the Act, would make rights to many domain
names "effectively unalienable, whether the alienation is by gift,
sale, or other form or transfer."' Since nothing in the text or
structure of the statute indicates that Congress intended rights in
domain names be inalienable, the Ninth Circuit held that Digital
Overture's re-registration of <gopets.com> was not a registration
within the meaning of § 1 125(d)(1).1 34
However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling
that the additional domains registered by Hise after the GoPets
mark was distinctive were registered in bad faith.' The Ninth
Circuit found that the minimum statutory damages, $1,000 per
domain name, for each of the additional domain names was
appropriate, as well as the transfer of the additional domain names
from Hise to GoPets. 136
Finally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
determination that Hise violated the Lanham Act when he put
"GoPets.com the official online website," on <gopets.com>.'
Since the district court had based relief on the ACPA
<gopets.com> violation, the Ninth Circuit remanded to determine
what relief GoPets, Ltd. was entitled under the Lanham Act."'
IV. ANALYSIS
While the Ninth Circuit categorized the action of Hise as a "re-
registration,"'3 9 it is clear that there are substantive differences
between Hise's action and the action of the defendant in
Schmidheiny. The defendant in Schmidheiny, who transferred
registrars and named a different party as the registrant, created a
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1031-32.
134. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1032.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1035.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1030.
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new registration contract, 140 while Hise's actions, changing the
domain name's billing information but maintaining the same
registrar,141 likely did not. However, the Ninth Circuit did not note
this distinction in its opinion.
This distinction is important because it highlights the difficulties
of defining registration. There are many actions that can be
undertaken by registrants, and these actions can have very
different consequences, particularly with respect to the rights of
third parties.'42 Though these consequences may affect the
trademark or personal rights of other people, absent a consistent
definition of registration, it will be difficult for innocent registrants
to determine whether or not their actions fall within the scope of
the Act. Thus, it is necessary consider what the definition of
registration should be.
Part A of this section will discuss the plain language meaning of
the word registration, the structure of the ACPA, and the
legislative history behind the act. Part B will discuss an
appropriate definition of registration based on the legislative
intent. Part C will discuss how a broader definition would impact
the GoPets decision, as well as how the definition would affect
potentially innocent domain name registrants.
A. Plain Language, Structure of the Statute, and Legislative
History
It is a settled principal that the first step of statutory
interpretation is to determine "whether the statutory text is plain
and unambiguous."' 43 In order to do this, we should begin with the
140. Schmidheiny, 319 F.3d at 583.
141. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Claims for
Federal and State Service Mark Infringement and Unfair Competition, and
Cybersquatting in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(b), Declaration of Clifford S.
Davidson, Ex. C., at 76-85, GoPets, Ltd. v. Hise, No. CV 07-1870 AH-tM (C.D.
Cal. June 10, 2008).
142. Whenever a new registration contract is created, the term of the contract
may change; thus, the domain name remains unavailable to third parties who
might wish to purchase it.
143. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009)
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plain and ordinary meaning of the word "register."1 44 Webster's
New World Dictionary defines "register" as a verb, meaning "(a)
to make or secure official enter of in a register, or (b) to enroll
formally .. . "14' Black's Law Dictionary defines "register" as verb
which means "(1) to enter into a public registry, [or] (2) to enroll
formally. . . "146 Under these definitions, any action that results in
a formal enrollment would be considered a registration.
It is likely that the creation registration constitutes a formal
enrollment, and thus, satisfies the plain meaning definition of
registration. When an individual registers a domain name with a
registrar, the registrar passes that information to the registry.14 7
This action likely constitutes a formal enrollment to a public
registry. However, since domain names are registered on a first
come, first served basis,148 actions that take place after the domain
name has been registered are unlikely to result in the removal of
the domain name from the registry, making the domain name
effectively unavailable to third parties.'4 9 Therefore, it would be
hard for subsequent actions to be considered some kind of formal
enrollment. The plain language definition seems to support the
Ninth Circuit interpretation, as a formal enrollment would likely
only result from the initial creation registration.
An analysis of the Act's structure also seems to support the
Ninth Circuit definition. The word register and registration appear
in several different places throughout the statute. Under the
trademark section, in order for a person to be liable, the registrant
must register the domain name prior to when the mark became
distinctive or famous.'s Under the personal name section, an
individual becomes liable if they register the domain name after
the effective date of the Act."' Despite the importance of the
144. Id. at 388.
145. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY SECOND COLLEGE EDITION, 1198
(1982).
146. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY THIRD POCKET EDITION, 603 (2006).
147. MCGRADY, supra note 9, § 1.09.
148. Id.
149. An exception to this would be a failure to renew the domain name. See
Id.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(l)-(II).
151. Id. § 8131(4).
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timing of a registration for whether or not an individual is liable
under the Act, Congress did not define the term. This is in contrast
to other terms that Congress did define in the statute.'52 If
Congress wanted to establish a different definition of registration,
outside of the plain meaning, they would have explicitly listed it.
Accordingly, it would seem that a plain meaning definition of
registration is appropriate.
However, neither the Third Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit adopted
this plain meaning approach. Instead, the Ninth Circuit evaluated
the term registration in light of traditional property law;"' while
the Third Circuit rejected the lower courts plain meaning approach
and defined registration with respect to the policy
considerations.'5 4 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit highlighted what
it felt were potential areas of ambiguity with respect to the
definition of registration."' Though the plain meaning of
registration supports the Ninth Circuit definition, the court's
unwillingness to apply a plain language meaning is somewhat
telling and shows that there is sufficient ambiguity as to the
meaning of the term to warrant further investigation. Based on
this ambiguity, courts are permitted to look to the legislative
history of the Act and determine whether using the plain meaning
is inconsistent with the goals of the ACPA.'56
From the legislative history, it is clear that the primary reason
for the ACPA was to expand the available causes of action against
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(E) ("[T]he term "traffics in" refers to
transactions that include, but are not limited to, sales, purchases, loans, pledges,
licenses, exchanges of currency, and any other transfer for consideration or
receipt in exchange for consideration."); Anticybersquatting Consumer Protect
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3005, 113 Stat. 1501A-445, 1501A-550 ("The term
'domain name' means any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or
assigned by any domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain
name registration authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet. The
term 'Internet' has the meaning given that term in section 230(f )(1) of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(f)(1)).").
153. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1031.
154. Schmidheiny, 319 F.3d at 582-83.
155. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1030-3 1.
156. See, e.g., Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401(1992) ("[A]ppeals to
statutory history are well taken only to resolve statutory ambiguity.")
470
22
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol22/iss2/6
2012] A REASONABLE RENDITION OF REGISTRATION
cybersquatters. This was largely due to the difficulties
associated with the application of then-existing trademark law to
the typical cybersquatter.'" While the legislative history proclaims
that both the personal name and trademark sections are "narrowly"
tailored to solve this specific problem,' it also makes it
abundantly clear that Congress had noticed that traditional
trademark law actions were ineffective at combating
cybersquatters and a new, more expansive means of protecting
trademark holders and individuals was warranted.'60
Though the legislature wished to expand the reach of trademark
law, Congress also intended to protect the rights of innocent
registrants that lack bad faith intent to profit.' In order to do this,
Congress listed nine bad faith factors in the trademark section of
the Act.'6 2 These factors were meant to assist courts in
157. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
158. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7 ("While the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
has been useful in pursuing cybersquatters, cybersquatters have become
increasingly sophisticated as the case law has developed and now take the
necessary precautions to insulate themselves from liability."); H. REP. No. 106-
412, at 6 ("Currently, the legal remedies available to trademark owners to
prevent cyberpiracy are both expensive and uncertain.").
159. See 145 CONG REC. S14696, 14713 ("The bill is carefully and narrowly
tailored, however, to extend only to cases where the plaintiff can demonstrate
that the defendant registered, trafficked in, or used the offending domain name
with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a mark belonging to someone
else. . ."); Id. at 14715 ('the provision is still very narrow in that it requires a
showing that the registrant of the domain name registered that name with a
specific intent to profit from the name by selling it to that person or to a third
party for financial gain.").
160. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7.
161. 145 CONG REC. S14696, 14713 ("[T]he bill does not extend to innocent
domain name registrations by those who are unaware of another's use of the
name, or even to someone who is aware of the trademark status of the name but
registers a domain name containing the mark for any reason other than with bad
faith intent to profit from the goodwill associated with that mark.").
162. Id. ("These factors are designed to balance the property interests of
trademark owners with the legitimate interests of Internet users and others who
seek to make lawful uses of others' marks, including for purposes such as
comparative advertising, comment, criticism, parody, news reporting, fair use,
etc.").
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determining whether bad faith intent to profit exists.' According
to Congress, these bad faith factors "balance the property interests
of trademark owners with the legitimate interests of Internet
users." 16
These nine bad faith intent factors are divided into three
sections.'6 ' The first section consists of four factors that "suggest
circumstances that may tend to indicate an absence of bad-faith
intent to profit from the goodwill of a mark."l 66 These four facts
consist of the following:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property
rights of the person, if any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of
the legal name of the person or a name that is
otherwise commonly used to identify that person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain
name in connection with the bona fide offering of
any goods or services; (IV) the person's bona fide
noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site
accessible under the domain name; 6
The next section suggests four "circumstances that may tend to
indicate that such bad-faith exists."'"6  These four factors consist
of the following:
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the
mark owner's online location to a site accessible
under the domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either for
163. 145 CONG REC. S14696, 14713.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(1)-(IV).
168. 106 CONG REC. S14696, 14713.
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commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or
disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation,
or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise
assign the domain name to the mark owner or any
third party for financial gain without having used,
or having an intent to use, the domain name in the
bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the
person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such
conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of material and
misleading false contact information when applying
for the registration of the domain name, the person's
intentional failure to maintain accurate contact
information, or the person's prior conduct
indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of
multiple domain names which the person knows are
identical or confusingly similar to marks of others
that are distinctive at the time of registration of such
domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of
others that are famous at the time of registration of
such domain names, without regard to the goods or
services of the parties;169
Finally, the last section consists of one factor: "(IX) the extent to
which the mark incorporated in the person's domain name
registration is or is not distinctive and famous . . . .""o According
to Congress, a trademark owner is more likely to deserve
protection under the Act if their trademark is famous or
169. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V)-(VIII).
170. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX).
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distinctive.' 7  This factor can either "suggest bad-faith or an
absence thereof depending on the circumstances." 72
In addition to these nine factors, paragraph (1)(B)(ii)
"underscores the bad faith requirement by making it clear that bad
faith shall not be found in any case in which the court determines
that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that
the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful." 73
Based on the existence of these factors, and Congress's
justification for them, it is clear that Congress felt the need to
protect innocent registrations.'74 The question then becomes how
to balance this protectionist impulse with the primary intent behind
the ACPA: the expansion of protection against cybersquatters.
B. The Appropriate Definition of Registration
The ACPA was supposed to broaden protections for trademark
holders and individuals."' The broadened protection was meant to
solve problems associated with traditional trademark remedies.
Since these remedies were thwarted by the ease with which
cybersquatters could avoid liability under the then-existing
trademark law,'76 it follows that Congress sought to encompass a
wider variety of actions within the scope of the Act. Therefore,
because the timing of registration plays a primary gate-keeping
role in the statutory scheme,'7 7 registration should be defined in
such a way as to allow for more actions to fall within the scope of
the statute. This supports a definition of registration that includes
the subsequent acts of registrants.
171. 145 CONGREC. S14696, 14714.
172. Id. at 14713.
173. Id. at 14714.
174. Id. at 14713 ("These factors are designed to balance the property
interests of trademark owners with the legitimate interests of Internet users and
others who seek to make lawful uses of others' marks').
175. 145 CONG. REC. S14696, 14713 ("This subsection amends the
Trademark Act to provide an explicit trademark remedy for cybersquatting
under a new section 43(d).").
176. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii); 15 U.S.C. § 8131(4).
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By keeping the definition broad, more actions fall within the
scope of the Act, which fulfills one aspect of Congress's intent.
The nine factors perform the other aspect: the protection of
innocent registrants. Therefore, a broad definition does not
necessarily act to the exclusion of the other legislative concern.
That concern is met by the existence of the bad faith factors, and
need not be met by a narrow definition of registration.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the definition should be the
creation registration."' According to the Third Circuit, registration
includes both the initial registration of the domain name, as well as
what it defined as a "re-registration."'7 9 Of the two definitions, the
Third Circuit's is obviously broader and therefore seems more
appropriate in light of the congressional intent.
However, the Third Circuit definition described only one
particular kind of "re-registration." Under Schmidheiny, the Third
Circuit definition includes activity that results in a new registration
contract between a different registrant and a new registrar.'
However, a different registrant need not be present for a new
registration contract to result. In fact, if a registrant transfers
registrars, the registrant binds himself to that registrar under the
terms of a new registration contract.'"' Should these actions
constitute registrations as well?
Since Congress sought to expand the causes of action available
to trademark holders with the ACPA,'82 it is appropriate that any
act that results in a new registration contract should be considered
a registration. This definition would create a broader range of
178. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1031.
179. Schmidheiny, 319 F.3d at 583.
180. Id. at 583.
181. See, e.g. Domain Name Transfer Agreement, GODADDY.COM,
http://www.godaddy.com/agreements/showdoc.aspx?pageid=TRANSFERSA
(last revised Aug. 17, 2011) ("[Registrants who have transferred to Go Daddy]
agree to be legally bound by the agreements that govern all domain names
registered through Go Daddy as found on the legal agreements page, including
the Domain Name Registration Agreement "); Transfer To Network Solutions,
NETWORK SOLUTIONS, http://www.networksolutions.com/support/transfer-into-
network-solutions/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (requiring agreement to the
Network Solutions Service Agreement).
182. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7.
475
27
Price: A Reasonable Rendition of Registration: GoPets v. Hise, Schmidhei
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXII:449
activities that would fall within the scope of the Act and allow for
a broader protection of trademarks and individuals, thus fulfilling
the legislative intent. Moreover, this definition is not overbroad; it
would not encompass activities that arguably have nothing to do
with cybersquatting in the first place.
Actions such as changing billing information for a domain name
would not be considered registrations. This is important because
agents should be able to register websites on behalf of their
companies, and then change registration billing information
around at a later date. These actions should not be considered
registrations because the term of the registration contract remains
unaltered, and the prospect of the domain becoming available
again on a certain date remains unchanged by the actions. This is
distinguishable from registrar transfers that result in a new
contract,' and may also result in a change of the contract term.184
This distinction is important because of the nature of
cybersquatting. When a cybersquatter attempts to exact high fees
from trademark holders for the purchase of the domain name, they
rely on the leverage that a first come, first served domain name
system gives them against trademark holders."' Actions that do
not increase this leverage, such as changing billing information,
should not be considered important enough to invoke the Act.
However, new registration contracts, may extend the term of the
registration, and can thereby increase a cybersquatter's leverage.
Once these registration contracts are created, the date that a
domain name may be available again becomes more and more
183. See, e.g. Domain Name Transfer Agreement, supra note 182
("[Registrants who have transferred to Go Daddy] agree to be legally bound by
the agreements that govern all domain names registered through Go Daddy as
found on the legal agreements page, including the Domain Name Registration
Agreement "); Transfer To Network Solutions, supra note 185 (requiring
agreement to the Network Solutions Service Agreement).
184. MCGRADY, supra note 9, § 1.11.
185. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 5 ("Some [cybersquatters] register well-known
brand names as Internet domain names in order to extract payment from the
rightful owners of the marks, who find their trademarks "locked up" and are
forced to pay for the right to engage in electronic commerce under their own
brand name.").
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remote, raising the level of pressure that the cybersquatter can use
against the trademark holder.
This proposed definition of registration also draws a very clear
line for enforcement of the Act. Records of when new registration
contracts are created should be readily available from registrars, so
it would not be difficult to determine when a new registration
contract was created and a "registration" took place. This would
result in the same level of certainty about what constitutes a
registration as the Ninth Circuit "initial creation" registration
definition, while providing the appropriate range of coverage for
Act.
C. Analysis of a Broad Definition ofRegistration
It is worth noting that if registration is defined as anything that
results in the creation of a new registration contract, both
Schmidheiny and GoPets would have likely reached the same
conclusion regarding liability under the ACPA. In Schmidheiny,
the actions of the cybersquatter created a new registration
contract,"' which would fall within the proposed definition of
registration. In GoPets, when Hise changed around the billing for
the <gopets.com> domain, a new registration contract was not
created."' Therefore, a registration would not have occurred at
that time.
While it is true that either definition might lead to the same
result in GoPets, the proposed definition and the Ninth Circuit
definition are vastly different and would lead to different outcomes
in different situations. Accordingly, it is important to determine
whether the Ninth Circuit's concerns about defining registration to
include subsequent actions were warranted. Essentially, this
requires determining whether a definition of registration that
includes subsequent actions can peacefully coexist with a desire to
186. Schmidheiny, 319 F.3d at 583.
187. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Claims for
Federal and State Service Mark Infringement and Unfair Competition, and
Cybersquatting in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(b), Declaration of Clifford S.
Davidson, Ex. C., at 76-85, GoPets, Ltd. v. Hise, No. CV 07-1870 AHM (C.D.
Cal. June 10, 2008).
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preserve the alienability of a domain name.'" This coexistence
would require an innocent domain name registrant to be
adequately protected by the nine bad faith factors in situations
where the domain name was registered prior to when a mark
became famous or distinctive. If innocent registrants are
adequately protected by the nine bad faith factors, then they will
not be found liable under the ACPA no matter what definition of
registration is used, and based on this, their property rights would
be largely unaffected.
1. Protection ofInnocent Registrants
Perhaps the best way to determine whether or not a broader
definition of registration can coexist with the protection of
innocent registrants is to go through a hypothetical involving an
innocent registrant. If the nine bad faith factors would provide
sufficient protection no matter what acts fell within the scope of
registration, then a broader definition of registration would not be
problematic.'
Assume that Business X intends to start a business venture that
never comes to fruition. While trying to get the venture off of the
ground, Business X registers a domain name that would eventually
correspond with Business X. However, after the Business X
venture fails to attract other investors, Business Y develops rights
to a trademark that is similar to Business X's domain name. After
Business Y develops its trademark right, Business X transfers
registrars and a new registration contract is created. Also, assume
the domain name in question does not consist of a proper name
and that the domain name was not used for any purpose prior to
when the other Business Y's trademark came into existence.
Would Business X's sale of the domain name at a profit be in bad
faith in light of the nine factors listed in the statute?
188. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1031-32.
189. 1 have chosen this fact pattern because I believe it represents a
particularly good and lifelike example of innocent registration that might fall
under the scope of the Act if the proposed definition of registration was used.
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As mentioned above, the first four bad faith factors listed in the
Act are meant to indicate an absence of bad faith.19 0 Assuming that
Business X does not have any intellectual property rights in the
domain name, that the domain name did not consist of a personal
name, and that the domain name remained undeveloped and was
not used for any commercial or non-commercial purpose, the first
four bad faith factors would not weigh in favor of Business X."'
However, the absence of these factors would not necessarily weigh
in favor of Business Y. Though these factors tend to indicate a
lack of bad faith,'92 their absence does not establish that bad faith
exists. Rather, Business Y would still bear the burden of
establishing bad faith intent to profit if Business Y brought suit
against Business X.'93
Factor's five through eight, which are factors that indicate the
presence of bad faith,'94 would also not explicitly favor Business
Y. Since the domain name was not used for any purpose, it could
not be said that Business X intended to divert the consumers from
Business Y's online location. Thus, the fifth factor would not
weigh against the entrepreneur.19 5 Additionally, so long as
Business X could show that they intended to use domain name for
a legitimate purpose, the sixth factor would not show bad faith.'96
Further, so long as Business X did not use a false name or acquire
multiple domain names that are confusingly similar to other
trademarks that were distinctive at the time of registration, it is
unlikely that bad faith would be found.'
190. 145 CONG. REc. S14696, 14713.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
192. 145 CONG. REc. S14696, 14713.
193. MCGRADY, supra note 9, § 2.16.
194. 145 CONG. REC. S 14696, 14713.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V).
196. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI); see also 145 CONG. REC. S14714 ("Indeed,
there are cases in which a person registers a name in anticipation of a business
venture that simply never pans out. And someone who has a legitimate
registration of a domain name that mirrors someone else's domain name, such
as a trademark owner that is a lawful concurrent user of that name with another
trademark owner, may, in fact, wish to sell that name to the other trademark
owner. This bill does not imply that these facts are an indication of bad-faith.").
197. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VII)-(VIII).
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Finally, the ninth factor is likely unimportant in the hypothetical
listed above. Though the more famous or distinctive the mark, the
more protection the mark is afforded under the act,'" it seems
unlikely that a court would find that Business Y's successful
branding would provide evidence of bad faith intent absent the
existence of some other factors.
Accordingly, Business X would likely not be found liable under
the Act. Since Business Y would bear the burden of proof with
respect to bad faith intent to profit,'99 and since none of the factors
seem to weigh in favor of Business Y, they would be unlikely to
prevail and Business X would avoid liability. While a narrow
definition of registration might keep Business X out of court
altogether, Business Y would have a hard time proving the bad
faith intent of an innocent registrant during the proceeding. Thus,
the nine bad faith factors provide adequate protection for innocent
registrants, and registration can be defined without this protection
in mind.
2. The Alienability ofProperty
But what happens if a third-party purchases that domain name
from the entrepreneur in the above hypothetical? Would third
parties have fewer rights than the registrant who originally
registered the domain name, as the Ninth Circuit feared?200 The
answer would appear to be that they would have the same exact
rights as the original purchaser. Just as Business X could not
engage in activity that would violate the trademark rights of
another party, a subsequent purchaser would be bound by existing
trademark law.
However, this would be the case no matter what circumstances
preceded the sale. It is well settled that a domain name owner's
actions are constrained by traditional trademark law, regardless of
whether they fall inside or outside the scope of the ACPA.20 '
198. 145 CONG. REc. S14696, 14713.
199. MCGRADY, supra note 9, § 2.16.
200. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1031-32.
201. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th
Cir.1998) (holding that a cybersquatters activities had diluted a famous mark);
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Adding ACPA claims to the list of causes of action available to a
trademark holder, which was the intent of the Act,20 2 does not
necessarily change this basic premise. Though it is easier to
prevail under the ACPA than it would be under a FTDA or
infringement action, the idea that trademark law can affect the
rights of a domain name registrant is not new or unwarranted.
V. IMPACT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION AND THE FUTURE OF
CYBERSQUATTING
Given the importance of domain names and the pervasive nature
of cybersquatting and domain name speculation, the situation in
GoPets is likely to repeat itself. Part A will briefly discuss the
future implications of the GoPets ruling and consider what the
consequences would be if the GoPets definition where to be
adopted. Part B will discuss what future measures can be taken to
combat cybersquatting.
A. The Implications of the Ninth Circuit Opinion
The Ninth Circuit definition of registration restricts trademark
holders to traditional causes of action if someone has registered a
domain name containing their mark, prior to when their mark
became famous or distinctive. As noted above, the ACPA was
passed largely because the actions under traditional trademark law
were ineffective at combating cybersquatters.20 3 By limiting the
causes of action for domain names that were initially registered
prior to when a trademark became distinctive or famous, the Ninth
Circuit is denying a class of trademark holders a cause of action
that would help combat cybersquatters. This allows cybersquatters
to escape liability in the same ways they would prior to the
passage of the ACPA and thwarts the intention of Congress.
Brookfield Communs. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir.
1999) ("[R]egistration of a domain name for a Web site does not trump long-
established principles of trademark law.")
202. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7.
203. Id.
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This limitation is particularly important because cybersquatters
often attempt to register domain names in anticipation of the
domain name becoming.associated with a future mark.204 In doing
so, the cybersquatters are attempting to profit off of the goodwill
generated by the hard work of other entities. This kind of ill-
gotten profit was one of the things that Congress sought to put an
end to with the passage of the ACPA. 205 Adoption of the Ninth
Circuit initial creation registration, as opposed the broader
definition suggested by the note, would allow cybersquatters to
continue to profit by registering domain names consisting of
plausible business names that do not yet exist.
B. The Future of Combating Cybersquatting
As is the case in most situations where courts are required to
determine the meaning of ambiguous terms in statutes, some kind
of instruction from Congress would be preferable to judicial
determination. If Congress were to give some instruction as to
what it considers registration to mean, further interpretation by
various Circuits would be prevented and both time and money
would be saved. However, whether or not this occurs will depend
on what kind of issues require Congressional action in the future.
In the event that Congress does consider adding a definition of
registration to the Act, it is hoped that the definition will be
broader in scope than the one offered by the Ninth Circuit. A
204. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4-5 ("In another example of bad-faith abuses of
the domain name registration system, Network Solutions-the domain name
registry that administers the Internet's ".com," ".net," ".org," and ".edu" top
level domains-pulled on a London computer club in May, 1999, that had
registered over 75,000 domain names using an automated computer program.
Their aim was to lock up all available four letter domains by systematically
reserving every possible combination of letters, starting with aaaa.com, then
aaab.com, aaac.com, up to zzzz.com, until every available combination had
been reserved.").
205. H. REP. No. 106-412, at 6 ("'Cyberpiracy' can involve individuals
seeking extortionate profits by reserving Internet domain names that are similar
or identical to trademarked names with no intention of using the names in
commerce themselves. Such actions undermine consumer confidence,
discourage consumer use of the Internet, and destroy the value of brand-names
and trademarks of American businesses").
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broader definition would cast a wide net and allow courts to focus
on deterring cybersquatting. In doing so, Congress could rely on
the nine bad faith factors to protect innocent registrants and even
eliminate the gate-keeping role that registration plays in the
statute. This would shift the focus of the ACPA away from the
timing of the registration to how a registrant uses or intends to use
a domain name.
While this idea is certainly worth considering, the action of
registration in and of itself can create liability under the Act. 206
Thus, even if registration were no longer part of determining
whether actions fall within the scope of the Act temporally, it
would still be necessary to define registration so that we could
determine whether a registrant "transfer, used, or registered" a
domain name with the bad faith intent to profit.207 Because the
proposed definition is related to actions that would potentially
increase a cybersquatter's leverage over a trademark holder,
defining registration as any action that creates a new registration
contract would broaden the category of actions that would fall
within the scope of the Act, and thus, fulfill Congress's intent:
combating cybersquatting.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit was correct in concluding that the term
registration is ambiguous.208 However, when the Ninth Circuit
defined registration, it did not take into consideration the intent
behind the passage of the Act. This led the Ninth Circuit to
consider the definition in light of property law and come up with a
narrow definition.209 Since a broader definition of registration,
such as the one proposed in this note, would more accurately
reflect the Congressional intent behind the passage of the ACPA,
and since the Ninth Circuit's property concerns are already met by
the existence of the bad faith factors, the appropriate definition of
registration should include actions subsequent to the initial
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
207. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
208. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1030-31.
209. Id. at 1032.
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creation registration. This would allow the courts to combat
cybersquatting more effectively and would not infringe on the
rights of innocent registrants.
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